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THE PEOPLE’S NIH?  ETHICAL AND LEGAL
CONCERNS IN CROWDFUNDED
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
JOSHUA E. PERRY, JD, MTS*
ABSTRACT
Over the last decade, online crowdfunding has become a mainstream
source of capital formation for a range of artistic and entrepreneurial
endeavors.  Low-barrier websites such as Kickstarter and IndieGoGo that
fund production of a movie or recording of an album, in addition to char-
ity conduits such as Kiva that facilitate the dissemination of microloans in
the developing world, are trusted fundraising mechanisms that offer alter-
natives to traditional financing through banks and venture capitalists.
Moreover, these models predicated on the solicitation of relatively modest
amounts of money create a more egalitarian investment environment
wherein donors can join the effort—and often receive some token reward—
in exchange for a sense of personal engagement and affiliation with the
underlying project being financed.  Crowdvesting is a kind of crowdfund-
ing designed to raise capital a` la traditional stock offerings and the sale of
securities.  Unlike charitable donations, such investment opportunities trig-
ger analysis under existing securities laws and regulations, some of which
date to post-Great Depression concerns, i.e., the 1933 and 1934 Securities
Acts and others flowing from the more recent Great Recession milieu, i.e,
the JOBS Act of 2012 and related state analogues.  Given the decreasing
availability of federal research funding, biomedical researchers have begun
to explore the potential for crowdfunding models of financing.  This paper
explores the ethical and legal issues triggered by the specific case of the
physician-researcher, active both in the clinic and at the bench, who seeks to
raise funding via crowdfunding channels.  Should physician-researchers
solicit research funding from their patients?  What are the implications for
the patient’s sense of trust and the patient’s relationship with the physi-
cian?  And what about those donating who are not patients or related
stakeholders, but rather interested and sympathetic donors who wish to help
the cause?  This paper maps the landscape of these questions and concerns,
and lays the groundwork for future empirical and theoretical explorations,
as well as policy and practice guidelines.
* Assistant Professor of Business Law & Ethics and Research Coordinator in the
Center for the Business of Life Sciences, Kelley School of Business, Indiana University.
Research support was provided by Ken Burleson.  Thoughtful feedback at early stages in
this project’s development was provided by Zoltan Tar.  Ken Pimple generously offered
engaging and valuable contributions throughout the writing of this paper.  I am grateful
to all three, and especially so to Julie Kadish for the invitation to participate in this Sym-
posium issue.
453
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDE\29-2\NDE205.txt unknown Seq: 2 20-APR-15 15:55
454 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 29
INTRODUCTION
Melissa Anderson Sweazy makes independent, short films.  When
she recently needed $8000 to fund her latest project, “The Department
of Signs and Magical Intervention,” she launched a campaign on www
.IndieGoGo.com to solicit donations from her friends and family.1  The
campaign launched on April 25, 2014, and ended a month later on May
25.  She raised over $11,000 from individuals who donated money in
exchange for a mention in the film’s credits, an appearance on screen
as an extra, or a prop skateboard ridden by the main character.  These
token tangibles, however, were not the primary motivation for most
donors.  Rather, Ms. Sweazy was offering to the public an intangible
opportunity to become an insider on a unique and exciting creative
project.  In reality, her IndieGoGo appeal was intended to reach mostly
just friends and associates with a personal connection to her or the pro-
ject.  Perhaps random individuals might hear about the project through
social media and be moved enough by the film’s premise to share their
personal resources, but the thrust of the fundraising effort relied on
tapping into the sympathetic emotions and indie film passions of those
in Ms. Sweazy’s sphere of influence.
To promote and organize her fundraising efforts, Ms. Sweazy could
have chosen www.Kickstarter.com, the much larger and better-known
source for crowdfunding of creative projects such as films, music, and
video game development.  Launched in 2009, The New York Times called
Kickstarter “the people’s NEA,” because of its democratizing effect on
the landscape of grant funding and public support for the arts.2  She
chose IndieGoGo, however, because Kickstarter had denied a previous
request to establish a campaign for an earlier project.  It turns out that
Kickstarter has greater internal oversight and protections for potential
investors than does the upstart IndieGoGo, where a campaign to fund
virtually any idea can be launched immediately without internal
review.3
Jim Olson, who holds an MD-PhD, treats cancer patients at Seattle
Children’s Hospital, researches brain tumors at the Fred Hutchinson
Cancer Research Center, and teaches at the University of Washington.
He was also the subject of a profile in the July 2014 issue of Wired Maga-
1. The Department of Signs and Magical Intervention, INDIEGOGO, https://www.indie
gogo.com/projects/the-department-of-signs-and-magical-intervention (last visited July 19,
2014).
2. Rob Walker, The Trivialities and Transcendence of Kickstarter, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/07/magazine/the-trivialities-and-transcen
dence-of-kickstarter.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
3. Philip H. Kim, TMI: Honest Claims and Risk of Overdisclosure in Crowdfunding Cam-
paigns, paper abstract submission to the Crowdfunding Conference at the University of
Colorado-Boulder on file with author (“Unlike Kickstarter, Indiegogo does not have an
internal approval process.”).  While Indiegogo does feature a “no gatekeeper” approach,
dubious campaigns have prompted a “comprehensive fraud protection system to protect
[its] users.”  James Robinson, As More Experts Dispute GoBe’s “Bullshit” Medical Claims,
Indiegogo Still Refuses to Pull Its Near-$1m Campaign, PANDODAILY (Mar. 31, 2014), http://
pando.com/2014/03/31/as-more-experts-dispute-gobes-bullshit-medical-claims-indiego
go-still-refuses-to-pull-its-near-1m-campaign/ (last visited March 13, 2015).
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zine.4  According to the story in Wired, Dr. Olson had an idea several
years ago for a concoction he calls “Tumor Paint,” the purpose of which
is to identify all of the malignant cells in a patient’s body and the main
ingredient of which is a molecule found in the stinger of the death-
stalker scorpion.  Such an exotic ingredient proved too outlandish for
traditional biomedical research-funding organizations, such as the
National Institutes of Health (“NIH”), a unit of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services that makes available the largest source of
medical research funding in the world via a rigorously competitive sys-
tem of peer-reviewed grants.5  Dr. Olson instead turned to a crowdfund-
ing model and asked his pediatric cancer patients and their families to
fund his untested idea involving fluorescent scorpion toxin.6  Similar to
Ms. Sweazy’s strategy, Dr. Olson’s pursuit of biomedical research fund-
ing focused on his relationships with patients and his “steady bedside
manner” that had “always been much appreciated by the families of
Olson’s patients,” who had “long expressed their gratitude by support-
ing his research.”7
As frustration mounted in the face of failed attempts to secure
grants for his chlorotoxin research, “parents upped their fundraising
efforts,” and Olson  “embraced their generosity.”8  In fact, assured by
early donors “that they would go to any length” to make sure Olson
received the necessary funding, he expanded his fundraising appeals to
additional families.9
For parents who had witnessed their children confront the limits of
cancer surgery, Olson’s chlorotoxin pitch was particularly persuasive.10
Among them was Kris Forth, whose son, Brandon, had multiple
surgeries to remove a tumor on his brain’s fourth ventricle.
“There was always a piece of the cancer left inside him,” says
Forth, who was by Brandon’s bedside when he died in March 2010
at the age of 11.  “If Tumor Paint had been available then, it prob-
ably would have changed the outcome.”  As part of her healing
process, she opened a thrift store that has given tens of thousands
of dollars to Olson’s lab; an informational poster about Tumor
Paint hangs by the shop’s cash register.11
After quickly raising $5 million, Dr. Olson’s “Tumor Paint” is cur-
rently in Phase I clinical trials.12  Dr. Olson’s crowdfunding, however,
was not accomplished via the well-established, internally-regulated Kick-
4. Brendan I. Koerner, One Doctor’s Quest to Save People by Injecting Them With Scorpion
Venom, WIRED MAGAZINE, July 2014, at 96.
5. See NIH Almanac, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/
(last visited Nov. 28, 2014).
6. Koerner, supra note 4, at 98.
7. Id. at 103. For example, Koerner reports that “[s]hortly after Olson founded his
Fred Hutchinson lab in 2000, for example, a few parents banded together to host chili
cook-offs and golf tournaments to raise money for staff salaries.”
8. Id. at 103.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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starter or the upstart, decentralized IndieGoGo.  Rather, Dr. Olson’s
online biomedical research fundraising tool was a custom-created web-
site called Project Violet, a “philanthropic effort to drive early drug dis-
covery at Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center,” which, along with
“certain investigators,” has “equity interests.”13
While the Olson illustration appears—at least at this point in
time—to be a story of successful entrepreneurial innovation in the
funding of biomedical research, I argue that crowdfunding in this con-
text triggers a number of ethical and regulatory issues that deserve care-
ful consideration by professional societies and policy makers.  Part I of
this article presents a brief background on crowdfunding.  In Part II, I
explore the ethical differences between the contexts in which Ms.
Sweazy and Dr. Olson used the crowdfunding model of fundraising.
Specific issues I explore include the inevitable trading upon trust that
(ideally) gets established in the physician-patient relationship; the con-
comitant potential for raising false hope in the context of emotionally
vulnerable patients and patients’ family members—who may have com-
promised judgment; and the ever-present conflicting interests and zeal-
ous optimism of researchers/physicians who must find a way to balance
their personal career/financial/publication pressures with the best
interests of patients.
Part III moves beyond the ethical considerations to explore the
legal and regulatory issues raised by crowdfunding of biomedical
research.  Many of the issues to be explored in the legal sections flow
from the Jumpstart Our Business Startups (“JOBS”) Act,14 Title III of
which provides a crowdfunding exemption from securities registration,
as well as its state-based analogs that have recently passed in many state
legislatures.
Ultimately, if a researcher/physician/entrepreneur can raise
money while avoiding regulatory scrutiny, this opens up the possibility
of terrible abuses, including exploitation of patients and widespread
fleecing of unsuspecting donors, which again triggers nontrivial ethical
considerations.  This article attempts to fill a gap in the literature in
terms of the particular legal and ethical issues triggered by
crowdfunded biomedical research, particularly when the researcher is
also a clinician and the funding appeals are being made directly to the
clinician’s patients and their family, and to shine a critical light on this
new frontier.
I. WHAT IS CROWDFUNDING?
Crowdfunding,15 i.e., funding from the crowd, is generally under-
stood to be an approach to fundraising that seeks a large number of
13. PROJECT VIOLET, https://www.projectviolet.org (last visited July 1, 2014).
14. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, sec. 302(a), § 4(a)(6), 126 Stat. 306 (2012)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6) (2012)).
15. A similar term, crowdsourcing, refers to distribution of smaller, discrete respon-
sibilities for the purpose of accomplishing some large objective.  The term “crowdsourc-
ing” was apparently first used by Jeff Howe and Mark Robinson in the June 2006 issue of
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contributors—often recruited and organized via online social media
networks—to donate money to a specific project.16  Heralded as “a rev-
olutionary and democratic way to connect ordinary individuals with
innovative projects,”17 crowdfunding efforts aimed at specific projects
have been traced back at least as far as the funding of the Statute of
Liberty’s pedestal in the late 1800s18 and, of course, the art of seeking
small donations from large numbers of people has “been the backbone
of the American political system since politicians started kissing
babies.”19  The power of crowdfunding in the internet age lies in its
simplicity and accessibility.
Another way of thinking about crowdfunding is to compare it to
crowdsourcing or the open source movement in software development
where any developer in the online community can improve software
with added features and functionality.20  As Nikki Pope has docu-
mented, these online communities of shared interests have proven to
be hubs for the creation of products and services arising out of shared
interests.21  Threadless is an impressive example.22  In 2000, two indi-
viduals with a desire to begin a t-shirt business founded Threadless, an
online community that solicited t-shirt designs and allowed Threadless
community members to vote on their favorite designs.  Winning design-
ers received free t-shirts, and community members were permitted to
Wired magazine. Paul Belleflamme et al., Crowdfunding: Tapping the Right Crowd, 29 J. BUS.
VENTURING 585, 588 n.3 (2014).  Perhaps the clearest example of crowdsourcing is
Wikipedia, “an entire encyclopedia consisting of articles written and edited by the general
public.”  C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Security Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 1, 27 (2012).
16. Thomas Lee Hazen, Crowdfunding or Fraudfunding? Social Networks and the Securi-
ties Laws—Why the Specially Tailored Exemption Must be Conditioned on Meaningful Disclosure,
90 N.C. L. REV. 1735, 1736 (2012); Belleflamme et al., supra note 15, at 588 (“Crowdfund-
ing involves an open call, mostly through the Internet, for the provision of financial
resources either in the form of donation or in exchange for the future product or some
form of reward to support initiatives for specific purposes.”); Meredith B. Cross, Dir., Div.
of Corp. Fin., U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Testimony on Crowdfunding and Capital
Formation, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/2011/ts091511mbc.htm
(Crowdfunding “is used to describe a form of capital raising whereby groups of people
pool money, typically comprised of very small individual contributions, to support an
effort by others to accomplish a specific goal.”).
17. Sean M. O’Connor, Crowdfunding’s Impact on Start-Up IP Strategy, 21 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 895, 895 (2014).
18. Anjanette H. Raymond & Abbey Stemler, Trusting Strangers: Dispute Resolution in
the Crowd (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (citing BBC News, The Statue of
Liberty and America’s Crowdfunding Pioneer, Apr. 24, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/mag-
azine-21932675) (“The Statue of Liberty campaign resembles a modern online
crowdfunding effort in several impressive ways: the speed with which the money was
raised, the number of small donations, and the fact that the whole process was managed
by one agent – the newspaper.”).
19. JEFF HOWE, CROWDSOURCING: WHY THE POWER OF THE CROWD IS DRIVING THE
FUTURE OF BUSINESS 253 (2008).
20. Nikki D. Pope, Crowdfunding Microstartups: It’s Time For the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Approve a Small Offering Exemption, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 973, 975–76 (2011).
See generally HOWE, supra note 19, at 8 (“Crowdsourcing had its genesis in the open source
movement in software.”).
21. See HOWE, supra note 19, at 8; Pope, supra note 20, at 977.
22. HOWE, supra note 19, at 2.
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purchase directly from Threadless.  Six years after its launch,
Threadless saw revenues of $17 million.23
With crowdfunding, “[a]nyone who can convince the public he has
a good business idea can become an entrepreneur, and anyone with a
few dollars to spend can become an investor.”24  Such egalitarian access
has generated growth at a rapid rate.25  Crowdfunding websites raised
$2.7 billion in 2012, an 81% increase over the previous year’s fundrais-
ing totals.26  According to Massolution, a crowdfunding research firm,
more than 800 crowdfunding platforms are either active or planning to
launch.27
Contemporary, internet-based crowdfunding efforts can be usefully
categorized by the primary basis of the transaction: (1) pure donations
without anything received by the donor; (2) peer-to-peer lending with
or without interest recouped by the investor; (3) donations received in
exchange for a nominal gift/reward or advance opportunity to
purchase the product being created – but without the offer of any
equity in the business; and (4) crowdvesting, or traditional investment
opportunities offering an equity share of future profits.28 The pure
donation sites look and act like traditional charitable organizations with
donors receiving nothing tangible in return.  These sites—often admin-
istered by nonprofit entities or political candidates—constitute approxi-
mately 28% of the online crowdfunding marketplace.29  Contributors
often have no expectation of receiving anything in return for their
donation.  Peer-to-peer lending sites, such as Kiva.org, capitalize on the
power of the crowd to fund entrepreneurs and economic development.
One of the largest entities in this space, Kiva, uses a microfinancing
model to collect small amounts of money to finance entrepreneurial
endeavors in the developing world.30  Kiva donors do not receive inter-
est on their loans.31  Rather, the incentive is the knowledge that donors
are providing “safe, affordable access to capital to those in need” and
23. Id.
24. Bradford, supra note 15, at 10.  Whether or not one who contributes to a
crowdfunded campaign is an investor for purposes of securities law is an analysis that will
be more relevant to the questions I will explore in Part III.
25. See Kendall Almerico, Crowdfunding Growing at a Startling Rate, New Report Says,
ENTREPRENEUR (June 11, 2014), http://www.entrepreneur.com/article/234426 (noting
crowdfunding’s growth is doubling at nearly ten times the rate of Moore’s Law).
26. Kylie MacLellan, Global Crowdfunding Volumes Rise 81 Percent in 2012, REUTERS
(Apr. 8, 2013, 12:32 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/04/08/us-crowdfund
ing-data-idUSBRE9370QY20130408.
27. See MASSOLUTION, http://www.massolution.com (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
28. Id. at 14–27. See also Belleflamme et al., supra note 15, at 586 (Crowdfunding
investments “can take the form of equity purchase, loan, donation, or pre-ordering of the
product”).
29. Belleflamme et al., supra note 15, at 588 (citing an industry report at Crowd-
sourcing.org from 2012).
30. How Kiva Works, the Long Version, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about/how/even-
more (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
31. Id.
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thereby helping these people “create better lives for themselves and
their families.”32
Referenced in the Introduction, the most common crowdfunding
platform is the donation solicited in exchange for a nominal gift or
reward or advanced access to the product being created.33  Kickstarter
and IndieGoGo are the two largest reward/pre-purchase crowdfunding
sites.34  Each of these online communities allow entrepreneurs to pre-
sent their ideas and solicit funds for the development of artistic projects
or commercial products in need of financial backing.35  Typically,
donors receive some award or perk in exchange for their financial sup-
port, while the online platform charges a hosting fee in the form of a
percentage of funds raised.36
Often referred to as “enterprise crowdfunding”37 or “crowdvest-
ing” to distinguish it from models based on donations or lending
arrangements, crowdfunding that provides an equity interest, i.e., a
right to a share in future derivative profits, would appear to be as sim-
ple and straightforward as the other online crowdfunding models.
Because of federal securities laws, however, it is not.  The Securities Act
of 1933 and subsequent legislation was passed in response to the Great
Depression and intended to increase disclosure and market stability.38
These laws require a company to comply with complex and expensive
regulatory restrictions governing the advertisement and sale of equity
stakes in companies.39  The advent of crowdfunding, however, has gen-
erated much new legislation in recent years.  On April 5, 2012, Presi-
dent Barack Obama signed the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act
(the “JOBS Act”), which includes the “Capital Raising Online While
Deterring Fraud and Unethical Non-Disclosure Act (the
“CROWDFUND Act”).40  Additionally, twelve states have passed and
fourteen states (plus the District of Columbia) currently have pending
legislation creating state-specific, intra-state exceptions to permit small
businesses and entrepreneurs to tap into the crowd in search of invest-
32. About Us, KIVA, http://www.kiva.org/about (last visited Oct. 13, 2014).
33. Id. Approximately 43% of all crowdfunding platforms are based on this pre-
purchase or reward model.
34. Bradford, supra note 15, at 16.  Since its launch on April 28, 2009, Kickstarter
has raised $1.4 billion from over 5 million individuals to fund over 74,000 projects. Fre-
quently Asked Questions, Kickstarter Stats, KICKSTARTER, http://kickstarter.com/help/stats
(last visited Dec. 1, 2014).  IndieGoGo does not provide similar data.
35. Raymond & Stemler, supra note 18.
36. See Zachary J. Griffin, Crowdfunding: Fleecing the American Masses, 4 J.L. TECH &
INTERNET 375, 380 (2013) (“For example, when Josh Freese, the former Nine Inch Nails
drummer, sought funding for a new album, he offered a combination of reward and pre-
purchase benefits to potential contributors.  If someone contributed $50 to the new
album, they would receive a ‘CD/DVD set, T-shirt, [and] a ‘[t]hank you’ phone call from
Josh.”).
37. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 897–98.
38. Abbey R. Stemler, The JOBS Act and Crowdfunding: Harnessing the Power—and
Money—of the Masses, 56 BUS. HORIZONS 271, 272 (2013).
39. Id.
40. Id. at 271.
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ments to finance their business ventures.41  These legislative develop-
ments and their applicability to biomedical research are explored
further in Part III.
II. ETHICAL CONCERNS IN THE REALM OF BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
Writing over a decade ago, Kenneth Pimple attempted to bring a
measure of coherence to the field of research ethics.42  Recognizing the
complexity of subject matter encompassing “ageless moral truths and
recent arbitrary conventions; minute details of particular actions and
the broad sweep of public policy; life-and-death issues and matters just
the other side of simple etiquette,” Pimple proposed a series of three
questions to be asked of any research product or project:
• Is it true?
• Is it fair?
• Is it wise?43
With regard to the first question, Pimple was asking whether the
data and conclusions reported by the researcher corresponded to real-
ity.  In other words, had the researcher conducted “good science?”44  As
for the fairness inquiry, Pimple was pressing on the particular dynamics
of social relationships within the world of research.  Into this category
he placed “issues such as relationships among researchers (authorship
and plagiarism); between researchers and human subjects (informed
consent); between researchers and animal subjects (animal welfare);
and relationships between researchers, their sponsoring institutions,
funding agencies, and the government.”45  The final question is meant
to prompt reflection on the relationship between the research agenda
and the broader social dynamics.  Imbedded in the wisdom inquiry is a
series of concerns regarding unintended consequences for good or ill
that might flow from the research.  In short, to qualify as responsible
research conduct, the outcome must be a better world and/or an
improved human condition.46
Taking the specific case of Jim Olson’s crowdfunded research on
the use of deathstalker scorpion venom to illuminate cancerous tumors
41. States that have passed crowdvesting legislation, as of July 1, 2014, include Ala-
bama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Tennes-
see, Washington, and Wisconsin. See e.g., Summary of ENACTED Intrastate Crowdfunding
Exemptions (as of July 2014), http://www.crowdcheck.com/sites/default/files/Summary%
20of%20Intrastate%20Crowdfunding%20Exemptions_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 1, 2014).
States with pending legislation include Alaska, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Kentucky, Missouri, New Mexico, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Utah,
Virginia, and the District of Columbia. Florida and North Carolina have rejected
crowdvesting legislation.
42. Kenneth D. Pimple, Six Domains of Research Ethics: A Heuristic Framework for the
Responsible Conduct of Research, 8 SCI. & ENG’G ETHICS 191, 198 (2002).
43. Id. at 192–93.
44. Id. at 192.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 193.
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for purposes of surgical removal,47 each of Pimple’s three questions
prompt important considerations.  The first question is impossible to
answer in the absence of follow-up research and validation studies, but
the fact that Olson’s lab findings are now being tested in Phase 1
clinical trials suggests a preliminary conclusion that indeed the science
is good.  The second inquiry—in the context of crowdfunding solicited
from families of current and former patients—is more complex
because it raises a complicated concern arising from the relational
dynamics between physician and patient—and particularly what the
patient views as fair.48  The third question regarding the wisdom of the
enterprise touches in this context on the broader implications of these
practices, as well as how individual or public health harms can be
avoided or mitigated and the benefits justly allocated.  Whatever harm
or wrong, if any, comes from Dr. Olson’s enterprise will be small com-
pared to the consequences of a large-scale, laissez-faire approach per-
mitting the unchecked proliferation of similar projects.  The time to
consider the future and the social and scientific implications of
crowdfunded biomedical research is now.
In their groundbreaking in-depth interview study of medical
patients and what they can teach us about everyday ethics of healthcare,
Larry Churchill, Joe Fanning, and David Schenck define “being a
patient” simply as “being in a relationship with a practitioner.”49  This
ethically-complex relationship, rooted in vulnerability and trust, is ulti-
mately bounded by a sense of fairness.50
Fairness here is about recognizing and respecting the roles and
responsibilities the partners in doubled-agency carry as they come
together with the intent of healing the patient.  Fairness in this
sense always has multiple dimensions.  Patients may treat clini-
cians unfairly, they may violate the trust of that relationship by
using the clinician to access controlled substances or by refusing
to follow the guidance of the clinicians on matters essential to the
patient’s healing.  In turn, clinicians may treat patients unfairly and
may violate their trust by engaging them primarily as consumers and fee-
units, or by ignoring patient concerns and questions.51
It is here that the crowdfunding appeal flowing from physician to
patient prompts concern.  As the Wired story explains, when traditional
grant-making organizations denied his requests for funds to research
scorpion-venom molecules, Olson—in a “bold and unprecedented tac-
tic”—started accepting donations from the families of current and for-
47. See supra text accompanying note 4.
48. See infra text accompanying notes 41–52.
49. LARRY R. CHURCHILL, JOSEPH B. FANNING, & DAVID SCHENK, WHAT PATIENTS
TEACH: THE EVERYDAY ETHICS OF HEALTH CARE 4 (2013).
50. Id. at 141.
51. Id. at 142 (emphasis added).  The concept of doubled-agency is one the authors
employ to capture the dynamic of two actors—patient and physician—with separate iden-
tities, working toward a common goal, similar to the double effort in doubles tennis or a
double-play in baseball. Id. at 115.
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mer patients.52  In the context of relationships wrapped in
vulnerabilities and reliant upon trust, the physician-researcher who
actively raises money among his patients for any purpose—regardless of
how “true,” noble, and well-intentioned—triggers a number of ethical
and moral concerns.  For instance, there are knowledge and power
asymmetries between physician and patient, as well as conflicts of inter-
est that can cloud professional judgment and whittle away at a physi-
cian’s ethical obligation to protect her patients’ best interests.  These
specific concerns and the more general specter of commercialization
and commodification are already pervasive in the ecology of health care
in the United States.53
Indeed, recent observers have become increasingly concerned
about the tension between commerce and professionalism in medical
care.54  Offering a variation on the Hippocratic theme, Harvard Busi-
ness School professor John H. McArthur and Harvard Medical School
surgeon Francis D. Moore, writing in the late 1990s, suggested that,
The fundamental act of professional medical care is the assump-
tion of responsibility for the patient’s welfare—an unwritten . . .
acknowledgement by the physician that “We will take care of you.”
The essential image of the professional is that of a practitioner
who values the patient’s welfare above his or her own and provides
52. Koerner, supra note 4, at 98.
53. See generally Joshua E. Perry, The Ethical Costs of Commercializing the Professions:
First-Person Narratives From the Legal and Medical Trenches, 13 U. PA. J.L. & SOC. CHANGE 169,
169–201 (2010) (drawing upon interviews with physicians to explore the realities of finan-
cial pressures in the clinical environment); infra text accompanying notes 46–48.
54. See John H. McArthur & Francis D. Moore, The Two Cultures and the Health Care
Revolution, 277 JAMA 985 (1997) (arguing that while traditions of commercialism and
professionalism both share a central role in the evolution of social institutions in the
United States, “threats” exist to the “quality and scope of medical care” when “the tradi-
tion of medical professionalism is overtaken by the commercial ethic and by corporations
seeking profit for investors from clinical care of the sick”); Joseph J. Fins, Commercialism in
the Clinic: Finding Balance in Medical Professionalism, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS
425, 425 (2007) (“There is a palpable malaise in American medicine as clinical practice
veers off its moorings, swept along by a new commercialism that is displacing medical
professionalism and its attendant moral obligations.”); William S. Andereck, Commodified
Care, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 398 (2007) (examining the characteristics of
healthcare commodification in the context of medical care and exploring its effects on
the doctor-patient relationship); Larry R. Churchill, The Hegemony of Money: Commercialism
and Professionalism in American Medicine, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 407 (2007)
(exploring the cultural meaning attached to money and its pervasive force throughout
medical research, education, and the delivery of health services);  Marc A. Rodwin, Medi-
cal Commerce, Physician Entrepreneurialism, and Conflicts of Interest, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTH-
CARE ETHICS 387 (2007) (tracing the historical development of medical commerce in the
United States from the late 18th century through the early 21st century and arguing that
the primary problem of commercialism in medicine today is the conflict of interest that
arises in the context of physician entrepreneurship when loyalty to patients and the exer-
cise of independent professional judgment is compromised); Jacob Needleman, A Philoso-
pher’s Reflection on Commercialism in Medicine, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHICS 433,
437 (2007) (advocating for greater self-awareness among physicians regarding those ways
in which “the money factor . . . in one’s own experience as a physician, now impacts the
human values often assumed to define the art of medicine, understood as the work of
always and in everything giving first priority to the health and well-being of the individual
patient”).
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service even at a fiscal loss and despite physical discomfort or
inconvenience.55
While many doctors have always made a good living, the systems in
which medicine is practiced have changed in recent decades and profit
has, in many instances, surpassed altruism as the locus of professional
concern.56  Writing in 2007, Arnold S. Relman, a physician and former
editor of The New England Journal of Medicine observed that “financial
ambition” increasingly seems to be trumping professional ethics as phy-
sicians now labor in a dysfunctional system “incompatible with the
needs of community and personal medical care and the values of medi-
cal professionalism that have traditionally shaped the behavior of our
physicians.”57
Furthermore, it is important to note that half of all biomedical
research is funded by industry and concomitantly guided by industry
research priorities and design.58  Industry, of course, is driven by profit
concerns.  Another significant portion of all biomedical research is
funded by academic medical centers.  While ostensibly driven by a non-
profit mission, institutional profit, as well as institutional objectives are
inevitably in the mix as research projects are supported, or not, by the
researchers home academic institution.  As Margaret Foster Riley
argues, it becomes difficult to distinguish between industry interests,
academic interests, and federal interests and the implications are “dis-
couraging.”59  She continues:
Some discoveries necessary to ready the foundation for future dis-
covery are not being made.  More and more dollars are diverted
to research that is focused on developing products that are cost-
lier and therefore more profitable. . . .  Researchers are forced to
hype their research so that they can attract private venture capital.
This all leads to the question of whether all federal funds used for
biomedical research are truly serving the public interest. . . .  New
regulatory solutions and institutions may be required.60
As an alternative funding mechanism free of external institutional
investors, i.e., industry, venture capitalist, or academia, making a
research project available to the crowd suggests a potential source of
revenue that might simultaneously protect the autonomy of the
research scientist, while also keeping first and foremost the interests of
55. See McArthur & Moore, supra note 54, at 985.
56. John Lantos, RVUs Blues: How Should Docs Get Paid?, 33 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 37,
45 (2003).  In the past, “doctoring was more about giving than about getting.” Id.  Lantos
laments the new forms of physician pay that incentivize expediency and efficiency—as
measured in outcomes—to the exclusion of those less measurable, vague healing skills
and virtues that contribute a moral value to the physician-patient encounter. Id.
57. Arnold S. Relman, The Problem of Commercialism in Medicine, 16 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE ETHICS 375, 376 (2007).  Dr. Relman prescribes a renewed resistance to the
tide of commercialism if physicians hope to reclaim “the moral high ground for a profes-
sion in danger of losing its moorings.” Id.
58. Margaret Foster Riley, Federal Funding and the Institutional Evolution of Federal Reg-
ulation in Biomedical Research, 5 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 265, 286 (2011).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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the future patient, as represented by the multitude of small-dollar inves-
tors.  In this way, one can imagine crowdvesting of biomedical
research—as long as protections are in place for the patients of physi-
cian-researchers—as a sort of democratization of the NIH, a diffusion
of interests away from pure profit considerations and a re-emphasis on
the types of concerns that might motivate multitudes of small-dollar
crowdfunders/investors, namely the alleviation of human suffering and
the sense of affiliation and connection attached to a sense of helping to
finance the creation of products that are good for society.
But would such an ownership interest be permissible under
existing securities laws and regulations?  To that inquiry we now turn.
III. CROWDVESTING AND REGULATION
Crowdfunding is uniquely positioned to assist biomedical research-
ers seeking early financing necessary to convert their ideas into viable
clinical trials and ultimately, successful therapeutic options for suffering
patients.  Much like entrepreneurs attempting to launch a business or
small business owners trying to keep their enterprise solvent,61
biomedical researchers face difficult challenges in today’s financial
environment where traditional sources of funding such as the National
Institutes of Health and National Science Foundation have increasingly
smaller budgets.  Depending on how avant-garde the researcher’s idea
might be, i.e., exploration of the potential to be found in molecules
inside the stinger of the deathstalker scorpion, traditional charitable
foundations, as well as private equity and capital firms, are also unlikely
to be interested.62  Given the challenges of the current financial cli-
mate, the allure of crowdfunding’s potential to provide the necessary
capital to initiate cutting-edge research is significant.
Yet, despite the apparent simplicity of the crowdfunding solution
for raising capital to develop and sustain the ongoing expenses of an
organization, securities regulations recognize a big difference between
token gifts or rewards most often featured in the campaigns initiated by
artists on Kickstarter or IndieGoGo and the offer of an equity interest
in the hoped-for ultimate outcome of the research.  As Professor
Thomas Lee Hazen has documented, “a business seeking investors
through crowdfunding implicates the securities laws which provide
investor protection by requiring disclosure and, in many instances,
registration of securities offered to the public.”63  This is, of course, in
distinction to those crowdfunding efforts that seek donations without
any promise of a return to the donor.  Such fundraising appeals that do
not offer investment interest to donors do not trigger the protections
and protocols of the Securities Exchange Act of 1933 (“1933 Act”) or
61. Stemler, supra note 38, at 272.
62. See generally, Jill E. Fisch, Can Internet Offerings Bridge the Small Business Capital
Barrier?, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 57 (1998) (discussing the reality that private
equity and venture capital firms provide capital to only a very small percentage of U.S.
companies).
63. Hazen, supra note 16, at 1737.
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the periodic reporting requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (“1934 Act”).64
Passage of these federal securities laws was triggered by the stock
market crash of 1929, and the legislative history reveals consumer pro-
tections were their intended effect, in addition to instituting some mar-
ket stability and integrity.65  Provisions of the 1933 Act make it unlawful
for a company to offer and sell securities without issuing detailed and
audited financial statements, i.e., a prospectus, about the company.66
The 1934 Act mandates that publicly traded companies make addi-
tional disclosures to the Securities and Exchange Commission and to
shareholders on an either quarterly or annual basis, depending on
whether certain exemptions apply.67  In short, to advertise and sell
securities pursuant to the 1933 and 1934 Acts, an organization must
fully comply with a complex and expensive set of legal and regulatory
requirements, fees for which can range from $300,000 to $500,000.68
Moreover, as Abbey Stemler has noted, “[m]ost companies inter-
ested in pursuing crowdfunding are also unable to resort to one of the
registration exemptions under the Securities Act and subsequent regu-
lations.”69  Yet, prior to the exceptions created by the JOBS Act of 2012,
proponents of crowdfunding solutions to the economic challenges fac-
ing entrepreneurs, small business owners, and, yes, biomedical
researchers seeking innovative healthcare breakthroughs, had few
options with regard to crowdfunding.  Passed with bipartisan support,
the JOBS Act rolled back a number of regulations in an effort to spur
the sluggish, post-Great Recession economy.70  More to the point of this
article, the JOBS Act included the CROWDFUND Act, which changes
the landscape for those seeking to fund their economic enterprise
through the power of the crowd.71
64. Id. at 1740 n.21 (“Section 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act includes stock, notes, and
investment contract within the definition of security [e.g., any note, stock, treasury stock,
security future, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest, etc.].”
(citations omitted)).
65. Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social
Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1221–22 (1999) (“[Felix] Frankfurter was quite
explicit that the purpose of disclosure was to affect the behavior of corporate managers,
bankers, and accountants.”).
66. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(a) (2006).
67. See Hazen, supra note 16, at 1742–43.
68. See William K. Sjostrom, Jr., Going Public Through An Internet Direct Public Offering:
A Sensible Alternative for Small Companies? 53 FLA. L. REV. 529, 554–57 (2001).
69. Stemler, supra note 38, at 272 (discussing Regulation A and Regulation D
exemptions that are recognized by the SEC).
70. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 906 (“In an effort to do something to help the still-
ailing economy, Congress passed the JOBS Act in 2012.”).
71. See Stemler, supra note 38, at 271 (discussing state-based legislation).  Indiana is
a representative state.  On July 1, 2014, Indiana passed new rules for state-based
crowdfunding, permitting Indiana-based investors to invest up to $5,000 per opportunity
and permitting Indiana-based entrepreneurs to raise up to $2 million.  Press Release,
Office of the Ind. Sec’y of State, Secretary of State Connie Lawson Implements Crowdfunding in
Indiana (July 1, 2014) (on file with author) (“Through Indiana’s new crowdfunding rules,
small businesses and entrepreneurs will be able to tap into the ‘crowd’ in search of invest-
ments to finance their business ventures.”); see IC 23-19-2-2 (27) Version b.
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Specifically with regard to those interested in crowdfunding, the
legislation created a crowdfunding exemption permitting those seeking
equity investors to raise up to $1 million within a 12-month period with-
out triggering the requirement to register with the SEC.72  Moreover,
this legislation is responsible for creating reporting exceptions that per-
mit publicly crowdfunded offerings to only make reports on an annual
basis.73  Companies seeking to raise money via crowdfunding are
required by the JOBS Act to disclose the offering’s purpose, the
targeted amount to be raised, the deadline for reaching such amount,
and the offering price.74  Additionally, risks to investors also must be
disclosed, along with information about the company, its officers, direc-
tors, major shareholders, and a description of the company’s business,
business plan, capital structure, and financial condition.75
Investors are protected to a certain extent by the securities laws’
anti-fraud protections, which cover fraud and misstatements in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities.76  In fact, the JOBS Act
specifically amends relevant portions of the 1933 Act to equip investors
with a remedy for misstatements and omissions made in connection
with an offering under the crowdfunding exemption.77  The enforce-
ment efforts of the SEC are, however, limited and it is unreasonable to
assume the Commission can be effective in the crowdfunding arena.78
Moreover, given the relatively small amounts permitted to be invested
under the JOBS Act’s crowdfunding exceptions, as a practical matter is
it unlikely that plaintiffs’ firms would be sufficiently incentivized to
bring suit on a contingent fee basis.79
As securities scholar Thomas Lee Hazen has observed, “[i]t is naı¨ve
to assume that limiting offerings to small amounts per investor will
deter scammers from taking advantage of investors via crowdfund-
ing.”80  Crowdfunding zealots may argue that the limited risk exposure
per investor warrants less regulation and cause for concern, and yet
“[f]raud in small packages can be just as effective and damaging to the
victims many of whom may be least able to bear the risk of even a small
investment in a speculative business.”81  Hazen emphasizes additional
dynamics in the online crowdfunding environment:
Investors in crowdfunding offerings are likely to be strangers to
the company and, as such, would have no information about the
company except for what is provided by the company or the web-
site where the securities are offered for sale.  If anything, the
impersonal nature of the Internet would seem to call for more,
72. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 315-21 (2012).
73. See Hazen, supra note 16, at 1743.
74. JOBS Act § 302.
75. Id.
76. Securities Act of 1933 § 17, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (2006); Securities Act of 1934
§ 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
77. JOBS Act § 302(b).
78. See Hazen, supra note 16, at 1757.
79. Id. at 1759.
80. Id. at 1765.
81. Id. at 1765–66.
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rather than less, investor protection.  Also, the solicitation of small
investors is likely to attract more unsophisticated investors who are
in need of the investor protection provisions generally found in
the securities laws.  It is also likely to attract investors with limited
funds who cannot tolerate high investment risk, even for small
amounts of money.  Furthermore, if an overly permissive
crowdfunding exemption were recognized, what is to prevent
scammers from repeatedly going to the same investors for pur-
portedly different investments?  Even putting aside scammers who
are trying to bilk the public, crowdfunding offers the potential for
raising large amounts of money, warranting the mandatory disclo-
sure that is required by the federal securities laws.82
Hazen’s concerns regarding investor protections mirror those
raised by Pimple’s questions in Part II as applied to concerns regarding
patient protections and the special dynamics of the doctor-patient rela-
tionship.  In the realm of biomedical project crowdfunding or equity
crowdvesting biomedical research—especially when a physician-
researcher engages her own patients—a number of additional protec-
tive and transparency measures are warranted.
Academic and independent biomedical researchers, or their repre-
sentative associations such as the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), the
American Medical Association (“AMA”), and the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (“AAAS”) should develop an internal
set of codes and restrictions, or at least advisory best practices and poli-
cies, to govern activity in this realm.  With the average crowdfunding
pledge under $10083 and securities regulations already limiting the
amount of intra-state equity crowdvesting investments, the potential
financial harms seem relatively minimal.  Internally generated proto-
cols, such as an outright ban on physician solicitations of donations
from their patients and patients’ family members, a less-comprehensive
prohibition merely on physician solicitation within the confines of the
hospital or clinic, or even a minimal rule banning the wearing of a phy-
sician’s traditional white coat when making an appeal for funds, all con-
stitute the range of rule-making professional organizations may want to
consider before triggering the attention of federal law makers and
regulators.
CONCLUSION
In 2010, Dr. Jimmy Lin, then a medical student at Johns Hopkins
University, adopted a crowdfunding model to fund Rare Genomics
Institute, a start-up genetic research center.84  Focused on raising small
82. Id. at 1766 (citing an SEC News Release discussing the SEC’s first publicized
enforcement action against an effort to crowdfund the purchase of Pabst Brewing Com-
pany without first registering with the SEC) (citations omitted).
83. Nick Shchetko, There’s No Refunding in Crowdfunding, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2014,
at B1.
84. Brian Farnkoff, Comment, Crowdfunding for Biotechs: How the SEC’s Proposed Rule
May Undermine Capital Formation for Startups, 30 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 131, 132
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donations of money from multiple sources online, Lin’s efforts demon-
strate the power of bringing “disparate individuals with common con-
cerns together through the Internet to actually fund an enterprise—in
this case an organization addressing rare genetic disorders.”85  Moreo-
ver, the success of Rare Genomics Institute also signals a potential solu-
tion to the dreaded “Valley of Death” problem that often makes venture
capitalists particularly uncomfortable.86  Indeed, low-dollar investors
captivated by the opportunity to collaborate with other low-dollar inves-
tors to aid in the research and development of life-saving therapies are
apt to be “less risk averse, more attracted to the hopeful idea of the
endeavor, and less concerned [than ‘angel investors’ or venture capital-
ists] with an immediate return on their investment.”87  In this case,
crowdfunding for biomedical research holds the potential to fill a gap
created by traditional fundraising models.
As bioethicist Marleen Eijkholt has observed, crowdsourcing in the
context of health care and biomedical research often includes an indi-
vidualized and personal health story characterized by a devastating,
incurable, or rare health condition that presents a compelling, difficult-
to-resist story to an online crowd.88  Eijkholt worries that presenting an
online audience with sensitive health information creates future pri-
vacy, discrimination, and stigmatization risks vis-a`-vis future employers,
insurers, and social contexts.89  Indeed, such detailed information
existing forever in the online environment does risk heightening an
individual’s vulnerability.
Again, as discussed in Part II, both opportunity for entrepreneurial
and positive public health outcomes must always be balanced by con-
cerns for the welfare of individual patients.  In the context of physician-
researchers, these concerns will be made particularly difficult by the
existing dynamics of the complex physician-patient relationship.  Physi-
cian-researchers have the potentially difficult dilemma of responsibility
both to an individual patient with whom a relationship characterized by
trust and vulnerability exists, as well as future patients whose suffering
promises to be alleviated.  And, as discussed in Part III, existing regula-
tions both at the federal and state levels are intended to protect unso-
(2013), citing E.B. Solomont, Lin’s Rare Genomics: Crowdfunding A Way to A Cure, ST. LOUIS
BUS. J. (Aug. 3, 2012, 5:00 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/stlouis/print-edition/2012/
08/03/lins-rare-genomics-crowdfunding.html).
85. Id., citing Interview with Dr. Jonathan Franca-Koh on Rare Genomics Institute’s
Use of a Grass Roots Approach to Raise Funds for Patients (May 22, 2013), http://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=2fmY1EDT2P0.
86. See Evan Mills & Jonathan Livingston, Traversing the Valley of Death, FORBES (Nov.
17, 2005, 4:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2005/11/17/utilities-emerging-tech-cz_1117
energy_programs.html. The term “Valley of Death” refers to the funding gap encoun-
tered by early stage companies who get caught between initial rounds of investment from
friends and family and the larger, more sustainable follow-up rounds of funding from
venture capitalists.
87. Farnkoff, supra note 84, at 158–59.
88. Marleen Eijkholt, Health Care and Crowdsourcing: A CrowdCry for Help, BIOETHICS
TODAY (July 1, 2014), www.amc.edu/BioethicsBlog/post.cfm/health-care-and-crowdsourc
ing-a-crowdcry-for-help.
89. Id.
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phisticated investors.  Con artists and securities fraudsters have found
fertile ground in the Internet’s various social media outlets.90  Ade-
quate disclosures and other regulatory protections are therefore justi-
fied by the inevitable specter of fraud.91
Of course, it must be highlighted that the case of Jim Olson, dis-
cussed in the Introduction, suggests none of the adverse consequences
to patients and their families explored in Part II’s ethical analysis or the
chicanery that disclosures are intended to thwart referenced in Part
III’s discussion of the governing legal and regulatory regime.  Indeed,
Dr. Olson’s use of crowdfunding appears to be nothing more than a
variation on the theme of charitable fundraising through the efficien-
cies and mechanisms that exist in 2015.  Yet, the fact remains that Dr.
Olson’s crowdfunded research is creating an intellectual property port-
folio with both long-term expenses and potentially lucrative returns.
Moreover, Dr. Olson is probably best seen as a pioneer in his explicit
use of the crowd to fundraise.  Others will surely follow, and tapping
larger amounts of crowdfunded capital by offering an equity interest is
sure to be an attractive funding vehicle.  As Sean O’Connor has
observed, based on his ten years of experience as counsel to start-up
companies in private practice and through the Entrepreneurial Law
Clinic at the University of Washington Law School, patents, for exam-
ple, can take a year or more to prosecute, with attendant costs in the
tens of thousands of dollars.92  Cash-strapped researchers are unlikely
to have the extra budget required to prosecute the patent, and
crowdvesting suggests a potentially viable way to raise these necessary
funds.
Ultimately, the power of mobilizing large numbers of small-dollar
funders to assist in the advancement of medicine offers an important
opportunity for the masses to engage with science and take a more
active role in the creation of next generation therapies.  Moreover, this
democratized approach to biomedical research suggests a less-fettered
agenda in which institutional stakeholders in industry or academia do
not have to be satisfied.  The enthusiasm I am suggesting, however, is
tempered by the real concerns around deception and manipulation,
first of actual patients (and especially if the physician-researcher is
attempting to solicit funds from her current patients) and second of
compassionate investors simply seeking to do good (while doing well)
with their investment resources.  Assuming these concerns can be
addressed, the future opportunities at both the federal and state level
90. See Hazen, supra note 16, at 1767 (citing to John Rothchild, Protecting the Digital
Consumer: The Limits of Cyberspace Utopianism, 74 IND. L.J. 893, 898 (1999)).
91. Andrew A. Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457, 1489
(2013).
92. O’Connor, supra note 17, at 898.  As O’Connor documents, patents and other
IP rights are critically important to the long-term success of a start-up, and if venture
capital, angels, friends and family, or personal resources are not available, alternative ave-
nues may be required.  “Given the interest in funding innovation evinced by contributors
to Kickstarter, IndieGoGo, and similar sites, crowdfunding seems to be a natural fit.” Id.
at 900.
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for the crowd to engage, as micro-investors, in the financial support of
biomedical research are opportunities that are worthy of continuing
and careful promulgation.
